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The task of theological interpretation should be shaped and regulated by an awareness 
of the issues at stake in theological method, and the debates surrounding this. Biblical 
scholars attempting to interpret the Bible theologically can often be naïve to the 
methodological shift that is required if the task is to be undertaken responsibly, and 
can pay inadequate attention to the distinctive identifications of the object of study—
e.g., as historical artefact or Word of God—that underlie the different methodologies 
of historical criticism(s) and theological interpretation(s). Biblical scholars who are 
principally trained in a historical-critical methodology focused on the justification or 
falsification of claims must understand that theological method is not merely 
concerned with truth and falsehood, but also with the architecture of theological 
claims, that is, matters of order, proportion, and articulation. At the same time, the 
biblical scholarly contribution cannot neglect the distinctive historical and creaturely 





In September 2015, I moved to the University of Aberdeen and gained a new set of 
collegial conversation partners, all interested in how the disciplines intersect on 
specific issues. The various dialogues that emerged from this happy situation led me 
to publish a number of works covering topics ranging from the doctrines of 
providence1 and divine aseity2 to the theological evaluation of autism and its place 
 
1 Grant Macaskill, “History, Providence, and the Apocalyptic Paul,” Scottish Journal 
of Theology 70 (2017), 409–226. 
within the life of the church.3 These works have sometimes involved scrutinizing 
significant debates in biblical scholarship using theological categories and insights, 
have sometimes been intended to show how the nomenclature and terminology is 
heuristically invaluable to the task of articulating the meaning of the biblical text, and 
have sometimes brought exegetical insights from biblical scholarship into dialogue 
with issues of practical theology. My highlighted word, “sometimes,” calls attention 
to something that I consider important: theological interpretation is not one 
homogenous thing, but can involve a range of activities and interests, approached 
differently because we recognize the mutual relevancy of the disciplines.  
The occurrence of the word “practical” in the title of this article is intended to 
reflect two points of critical significance. First, theological interpretation must 
actually practice the skill of interpreting theologically: that is, it must do some 
interpretation, and it must do this theologically. A common criticism of the 
theological interpretation movement (one made forcefully by Walter Moberly)4 is that 
it has often been locked in matters of prolegomena or theoretical hermeneutics, and 
has not actually reached the point of practice that is really needed to demonstrate the 
merits (or demerits) of these. Only by actually practicing what we preach can we 
 
 
2 Grant Macaskill, “Divine Aseity and Soteriology in the Gospel of John: The ‘I AM’ 
Sayings and Jewish Speculation on the Divine Name.” Journal of Theological 
Interpretation 12 (2018), 217–241. 
3 Grant Macaskill. “Autism Spectrum Disorders and the New Testament: Preliminary 
Reflections,” Journal of Disability and Religion 22 (2018), 15–41, and Grant 
Macaskill, Autism and the Church: Bible, Theology, Community. Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2019. 
4 “Although it seems accepted practice to write books about biblical interpretation that 
do not interpret the Bible, I am increasingly doubtful about the value of the exercise. 
Unless I am shown how the discussions of principle help enable recognition, or even 
production, of good and bad readings of the biblical text in practice, I can find myself 
wondering what difference it all really makes.”  Walter Moberly, “Review: 
Christopher D. Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning,” Journal of Theological 
Studies 59 (2008), 711. 
really test the value of our sermons. Second, the allusion to the discipline of practical 
theology is intended to remind us that this is not a merely academic activity, but one 
associated with the reality of living in the light of God and his work.  
In what follows in this article, I turn back to what we might call methodology or 
prolegomena, but I do so in conscious reflection on the practice of theological 
interpretation that I have engaged in over these last few years. What I write is 
informed by the particular areas of theological interpretation that have been part of 
my experience and, consequently, will not touch upon a range of other areas of 
activity that might fall under the umbrella term of theological interpretation, such as 
the place of ‘biblical theology’ or of reception history. 
 
 
The Modern Problem of Disciplinary Specialization 
 
One of the most basic practical challenges that we face in the theological interpretive 
task is the degree to which we are highly specialized practitioners of particular sub-
disciplines, shaped by the history of their development, often specifically the micro-
upheavals of recent decades, and have only a limited grasp of the cognate disciplines. 
As a broad macro-discipline, Divinity has been fragmented into sub-disciplines, but 
the fragmentation itself is not the only problem; rather, the substance of the problem 
is that practitioners of each have often retreated to the center of their particular 
fragment, to the bit that can be done without reference to its traditionally apposed 
disciplines, practicing it in a way that can be considered methodologically safe 
(especially for research esteem purposes). Biblical scholars do the historical or textual 
tasks that are central and distinctive to our discipline, perhaps drawing in other useful 
methodologies that might inform these, such as discourse analysis or social scientific 
criticism, but generally don’t move from the center to the broken edges that ought to 
be reconnected with those of the theological disciplines. This is partly because we 
have been cautioned against losing our moorings at the methodological center of our 
fragment, and partly because we just do not have time for something that might seem 
extraneous to our main task. We are just too busy staying on top of whatever is the 
current big issue in our own discipline.  
I find this image of fragmentation to be a useful one for analyzing the problem 
that we are concerned with here, for as we seek to re-integrate the disciplines, we 
have to bear in mind that the fragments were originally different parts of a unified or 
integrated task; they were not, in other words, identical to each other. Integration is 
not the same as homogeneity; that’s something else, something altogether less 
wholesome. Our attempts to bring fragments together are often frustrated by our lack 
of recognition that the other fragment is not the same as our own, or that the task 
before us does not involve melting the fragments into a new composite, but 
recognizing how it is that they can be brought together without losing the differences 
that allow them to complement each other, and properly to inform each other. The 







At the heart of such conversations is an identification of the task of each discipline 
and, I would suggest, the linguistics particular to it, which is the key to both the 
challenge and the opportunity. A brief discussion of this will help to clarify what I 
mean.  
Systematic or dogmatic theologies are concerned to give a proper and orderly 
ecclesial or creaturely account of what has been disclosed to us of God and his works. 
This involves a recognition that Scripture itself is not orderly, but unruly and wild; it 
norms Christian tradition not as a body of treatise, but as a collection of historically 
conditioned genres, ranging from narrative to proverb, commandment to apocalypse. 
The theological task does not seek to tame this wildness, or to impose order upon it, 
but to respond in a way that discerns the order within the wildness (the ecology, we 
might say), that is attentive to the relationship of the elements rendered in the 
canonical whole, and that is itself properly ordered, in a way that befits the work of 
those who are being renewed in the likeness of the Logos. This involves careful 
selection of words to render particular truths, and a careful use of grammar or syntax 
to govern the use of these words. Because the task involves engagement not just with 
a given pericope or author, but with the ‘canon’ (which is an important theological 
category in its own right) this selection of words and grammar necessarily grapples 
with the range of meanings and associations that given words might have in the 
different parts of the canon; to slightly misquote John Barclay: ‘grace may be 
everywhere, but it is not everywhere the same’5 a point that can be extended more 
widely to the lexicon of bible and theology.  If we fail to recognize this, and subsume 
or assimilate the language of theology to the language of exegesis, which is generally 
shaped in quite an immediate way by the language of the text in front of us (I’ll say 
more on this in a moment), then there will be problems. If, we fail to realize the 
properly synthetic character of theology, and the consequent shape of its internal 
linguistics and philology, we will fail to understand the nature of its relationship to the 
exegetical task. Words, sometimes the same words, will be used differently in each 
context. And if we are to develop any kind of facility with theological language, we 
need to spend some time with native speakers, the inhabitants of the fragment. 
The discipline of practical (or pastoral) theology also involves a negotiation of 
language, as it bears on the task at hand. Here, the linguistic dimension is shaped to a 
significant extent by the challenge of analyzing contemporary realities not named and 
perhaps not even imaginable by the writers of Scripture: how does one speak 
Christianly or theologically of autism or nanotechnology? We can certainly not go 
back to the Scriptural texts in which these things are described and engage in 
exegesis, for there are no such texts. Instead, we are driven to engage with these 
words, and the concepts that they name, and to reflect on what difference it makes to 
speak of them while also speaking of the God who has disclosed himself to us. Often 
the practical application of the task is itself linguistic: it breaks into the language acts 
by which non-theological accounts of particular issues render the matters at hand and 
holds them to account.  
This linguistic reflection takes us to one of the core elements that will run 
through what follows in this article. As biblical scholars, we are effectively trained to 
think of our exegetical activities, and the language by which we render these, as 
shaped by the identification of our object of study principally as an historical artifact. 
Our task, then, is somewhat akin to fracking: provided we apply the right machinery 
to the text, with the correct method, we will be able to extract its meaning. That 
 
5 Cf., John M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 565 
meaning is then generally expressed using the words found in the text, or their 
translational equivalents, as we understand them to be used in the text. Certain models 
of theological interpretation, particularly that of a certain kind of biblical theology, 
assume that the theological task merely takes what we extract by this mechanical 
process and applies it to theological questions. 6  Sometimes a notion of coherent 
biblical theology or salvation history is used to warrant such a move: trace the line of 
an idea through the Bible, relating it to an overarching narrative, and we can fairly 
immediately move to a statement of its theological significance. This, too, tends to be 
governed by a concept of interpretation that can be likened to fracking—it is 
‘exegesis’ after all; good method should lead the meaning out of the text—and, as 
such, it assumes a particular kind of relationship to the text, one that sees the 
interpreter as over the text, dissecting it or breaking it apart in order to obtain 
something from or through it. Subtly, the text becomes a commodity, something to be 
mastered and possessed and its value is in giving us access to something else. If, 
however, we identify the text as the Word of God, as theologically we must, then we 
have identified it as something not to be possessed, but to be heard, to be listened to. 
And, crucially, the appropriate response to that Word—especially when it functions 
not as collection of isolated texts, but as a canon—is not necessarily to recite its own 
lexicon, but to identify the correct form of words to speak faithfully of what we find 
there and to locate it with respect to our tasks.    
Importantly, then, we have a set of diverse identifications that need to be factored 
into the integrative practice of theological interpretation—identifications of different 
tasks and different modes of language at use within them—and central to all of these 
is the identification of the Bible, as it functions within our task. Here, though, is the 
point critical to our reflections in this particular volume: these identifications are not 
mutually exclusive. The Bible is a historical artifact, emerging from particular periods 
of time. It is entirely valid for some scholars to study it exclusively in such terms. 
Functionally, however, this does not exhaust its significance, and overlooks what for 
millions of people is its principal significance: that it is sacred Scripture. But if we 
choose not to adopt an exclusively historical-critical approach (bundling into that term 
 
6 This, for example, is precisely what N.T. Wright does in The Day the Revolution 
Began: Reconsidering the Meaning of Jesus’s Crucifixion (San Francisco: HarperOne, 
2016).  
the various ideological, literary or social scientific approaches), it is simply 
inappropriate to ignore its historical particularities. In fact, it is basically inattentive to 
the character of Scripture and to what has, in some traditions, been labeled its organic 
inspiration. This stands a criticism of the kind of banal examples of theological 
interpretation that can easily be identified, which effectively bypass the matters of 
historical importance. 7  It also opens the way for biblical studies, provided it is 
attentive to the linguistic negotiation required, to speak back to the appropriation of 
biblical texts in the theological task. Sometimes this appropriation simply cannot be 
squared with how the text is most obviously read in relation to the historical 
particularities that are part of its own witness, and this must be asserted. But we must 
be careful in doing so not to elide the differences between the disciplines that might 





The disciplines of theology operate with an identification of the object of study—the 
Word of God in Scripture—that prevents any constituent part from being considered 
the terminal point of interpretation. The exegesis of any given text must be related to 
the canonical whole, in a way that is regulated by a doctrinal system which is always 
(in principle, at least), subject to change if it cannot accommodate the scriptural 
testimony. This is different from the historical task normally performed by biblical 
scholars and also, it is worth noting, from the literary one. Literary studies, such as 
narrative criticism, are not the same as canonical engagement, and neither are those 
biblical theologies that conceive ‘canon’ simply in terms of a unifying overarching 
narrative. 
 
7  Note the comments offered by Markus Bockmuehl in “Bible vs. Theology: is 
‘Theological Interpretation’ the Answer?” Nova et Vetera 9 (2011), 27–47. In a 
memorable paper delivered at the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting in 
2008, a forerunner to the article just noted, Bockmuehl likened the blandness of some 
theological interpretations to recipes for clam chowder that observed the 
geographically enforced prohibition of certain ingredients.   
For biblical scholars, in particular, it is important to recognize that much of this 
task is concerned to identify the relations between the elements and order them 
rightly, ensuring that the correct elements are given controlling significance  over 
others (such as the way that the doctrine of God properly controls the doctrine of 
scripture, the significance of which must be considered derivative).8 This task also 
involves the recognition of articulations between doctrines, the neglect of which will 
lead to the distortion of theological assertions.  
One example of this that I have developed recently is the doctrine of providence.9 
Providence is the term that labels the acting of God upon his creation, as he works to 
bring creatures, and the creation as a whole, to their telos. While the doctrine has been 
subject to multiple definitions, many of which are notoriously problematic, it is 
nevertheless found throughout and across the theological traditions where, typically, it 
is ‘distributed’: that is, rather than being confined to one particular doctrine or area 
(e.g., theology or economy, creation or redemption), it is encountered across the 
systems, as it articulates with each doctrine.10  My own reason for considering the 
doctrine lies in some observations on the debate between Douglas Campbell and N.T. 
Wright over apocalyptic and salvation-history—in which both contributors see 
themselves to be developing good theology in a theologically responsible way.11 Both 
see themselves as theologically astute interpreters, arguing about the nature of God’s 
 
8 See John Webster, ‘The Dogmatic Location of the Canon’, Neue Zeitschrift für 
systematische Theologie 43 (2001), 17–43. 
9 Grant Macaskill, “History, Providence, and the Apocalyptic Paul,” Scottish Journal 
of Theology 70 (2017), 409–226. 
10 See the collection of essays in Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler, The 
Providence of God: Deus Habet Consileum (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
11  For the positions of each, see N.T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God 
(London: SPCK, 2013); idem, Paul and His Recent Interpreters (London: SPCK, 
2015); Douglas A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Re-reading of 
Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010). The introductions to both 
studies usefully highlight the convictions of each author on the theological revelance 
of their approach. There have also been several public debates between the two, with 
the most celebrated of these taking place at Duke Divinity School and at the Annual 
Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Diego, both in 2014. 
historical dealings with creation and with Israel and how these relate to the gospel, yet 
neither make use of the word that the traditions have used to speak of these dealings: 
providence. Presumably, the lack is to be traced to the obviously non-Pauline 
character of that word, though they are happy to use plenty of other words not 
encountered in Paul. Had they used the word ‘providence’, the conversation between 
them would have been quite different, since its distribution across the theological 
systems, and its articulation with other doctrines, would have required them to talk 
about the unexamined doctrines, or unarticulated assumptions, at work in their 
scholarship. Talk of God’s providence sets limits on the ways that we might speak 
pejoratively about the history of Israel or the Law, contra much of Campbell’s 
rhetoric; but it also demands that we consider providence as always, everywhere, 
mediated by the Incarnate Son, by whom and for whom all things were made and in 
whom they hold together. That is, considered through the doctrine of providence, the 
stories of creation and of God’s dealings with Israel are conditioned by the Christ 
event, and not vice versa, except in particular qualified senses.  This, I think, is quite 
at odds with the conceptualizing of salvation-history in Wright. 
If we get this wrong, if we fail to invoke the correct doctrinal term in the correct 
way, then the move is disastrous for practical theology. To stay with the example 
above, Campbell’s reading of Paul leaves no room for the apostle to sing ‘How I love 
your law … your statutes make me wiser than my enemies’ (Ps 119:97–8) and no 
room for any believer whose theology is shaped by Paul to find moral or pastoral 
instruction in the Old Testament (he does not discuss those points when Paul does 
precisely this, as in 1 Cor 9:9 or 1 Corinthians 10:1–11). 12  Wright meanwhile 
develops an account of creational order, and its place in redemption, that does not 
begin with the priority of the incarnation, but rather makes the incarnation a stage in 
the recovery of the original vocational state of man as the image of God. But what do 
we do with those who are prevented from fulfilling that vocation because of their 
disabilities? Classical theology can deal with this by understanding our image-bearing 
 
12On the latter, see my “Incarnational Ontology and the Theology of Participation in 
Paul,” in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Constantine Campbell and Michael Thate, eds., ‘In 
Christ’ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation, WUNT 
II, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, 87–102.  
 
as an analogical participatory condition and by accounts of providence that ascribed a 
distinct telos to each creature;13 Wright’s, like many contemporary accounts, requires 
a different idealism, one linked to the competency of the individual to fulfil the 
universal Adamic vocation.    
I use this example to highlight that an important part of the theological 
interpretive task involves recognizing that the articulations between doctrines have an 
important controlling effect on our discourse as we seek to move beyond the specifics 
of any pericope or author and to make a serious theological claim. As we move to 
such claims, we need to allow doctrinal articulations to inform and constrain what we 
say. While I have used providence as an example of this, a more important and widely 
found problem is constituted by the dislocation of Christology from its moorings 
within trinitarian theology proper. Ingolf Dalferth highlights some of the shifts that 
took place in the 19th century, particularly within Anglican theology, and specifically 
through the Oxford Movement, by which the incarnation became “the all 
encompassing paradigm of theological thinking,” a move that continues to shape the 
subsequent modern theological landscape. 14  Many who see themselves as 
theologically careful, because they prioritize christology or incarnation, may in fact be 
theologically careless, for their christology is not located properly with respect to the 
doctrine of God.    
But how can we, as biblical scholars whose theological formation is 
compromised by the disciplinary specialization I mentioned above, acquire a 
meaningful grasp of such doctrinal articulations, of a kind that will allow us to be 
sensitive to them and, indeed, to sensitively speak back to them? Let me make two 
practical suggestions.  
The first is, very simply, that we need to engage in conversations with 
theological scholars. Those conversations are, ideally, in the form of genuinely 
interpersonal or collegial interaction, but will also involve reading theological works. 
For those who do not enjoy the privilege of having colleagues who are willing to 
engage in such conversation, or whose collegial environment is less, well, “collegial,” 
the latter may be all that you have.  
 
13 I observe this point in Macaskill, Autism and the Church, 81–6. 
14  Ingolf Dalferth, Crucified and Resurrected: Restructuring the Grammar of 
Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015), 3. 
I use the word “conversations” here, rather than “dialogue” for good reason: 
dialogue implies that there is an attempt to reach agreement or to resolve differences, 
while conversation is more open, allowing differences to stand, and allowing 
discussions to move more broadly between particulars and frameworks. Conversation 
allows us to gain a more rounded familiarity with the other, while dialogue will be 
constrained by the issues at stake. Mapped onto our engagement with theological 
writing, “conversation” suggests a mode of reading that wants to “get to know” the 
field, that reads it for its own sake and in acknowledgement of its own value, rather 
than merely as something connected to our latest problem-solving exercise. Put 
bluntly, if we want to be good theological interpreters, we need to read more good 
theology, and to go beyond the superficial points of contact. 
The second suggestion is that we think seriously about how to incorporate this 
into our teaching. This can, at once, be a modest response to our perception that the 
disciplines are fragmented and that the next generation needs help to put them back 
together, and, at the same time, be an opportunity for conversation between 
colleagues (an exercise in teaching-led research). When I was in St Andrews, I co-
taught a course on Christology and Pneumatology with Ivor Davidson and it was a 
scintillating experience of such conversation; the co-teaching was done precisely 
through un-mapped conversation that was anchored by common engagement with 
scriptural texts and scholarly articles. Elements of it fed through to my books on 
union with Christ and now on intellectual humility and that single co-taught course 




If articulations are an important part of theological method, so too are proportions. 
The difference between a good theology and less good theology is not always a matter 
of the correctness or incorrectness of propositions, or of decisions on either/or 
matters, but is often about whether we have located the issue properly in relation to 
other doctrines and have dealt with it in correct proportion.  If our doctrine of sin 
occupies the same proportion as our doctrine of God, is there a problem with our 
theology? More subtly, perhaps, if our doctrine of Scripture has a similar such 
proportion, is there a problem? The point is a particularly important one for us to be 
aware of as biblical scholars, for at least two interwoven reasons.  
First, we can easily give a dominating proportion to elements that we encounter 
or detect in the text in front of us (often in isolation from the rest of Scripture) and can 
then seek to make that do more theological work than it ought to. This may be true of 
something like Roman Imperial Power, which would theologically best be cast as a 
particular sub-species of idolatry and then lined up properly in relation to the doctrine 
of God and the demands of trinitarian monotheism. This is a fruitful way to reflect on, 
for example, Revelation 13. If it is not properly so proportioned, we end up with a 
theme that functionally governs christological statements (seeing the representation of 
Christ in the New Testament as polemically directed against Roman Imperial Power, 
rather than as a function of monotheism with implications for this particular 
instantiation of idolatry).  
More subtly, Christology can come to have a proportion that eclipses other 
aspects of trinitarian doctrine and obscures its articulations with these. This, indeed, is 
one of the deepest problems in contemporary New Testament scholarship, even 
among those who are theologically interested; pneumatology as a category of 
monotheism has received much less attention than it should have, and the question of 
what God is in himself (theology proper, as distinct from economy) has similarly been 
neglected. This is especially problematic, because both elements are actually more 
important to the New Testament, proportionately, than is generally reflected in 
scholarship.    
Second, those who engage in the theological interpretive task within the 
evangelical tradition—and I suspect a number of us would identify in such terms, 
even if broadly—will often move very quickly from the exegesis of a text to the 
theological assertion, without reflecting on the theological task more fully. In such a 
situation, we are in danger of giving particular matters a proportion that effectively 
causes them to have a certain gravitational mass that controls other issues in a 
distortive way. These proportions, moreover, may reflect the fact that the issues have 
come to have such scale in our recent ecclesial traditions.  
Let me give two examples, highlighting along the way that our ascription of 
proportion has effectively eclipsed other relevant considerations and turned the issues 
in question into “either-ors,” rather than “both-ands.” Neither will require much 
explication. The first is Christology, and particularly the defense of high Christology, 
the identification of Jesus as God. For obvious reasons, this has been a battle that 
many of us have been concerned to fight, in order to defend what we consider to be a 
sine qua non of Christian theology: that our Savior is properly to be known as the 
incarnate God. But such is the proportion that we have given to this that elements in 
the New Testament (or scholars who comment on them) that are more concerned with 
the assertion of Jesus’ humanity are often underplayed or, in the case of the scholars, 
attacked. The reception of David Moffitt’s study of the atonement in Hebrews has 
been one such example: Moffitt was widely criticized in certain circles for what was 
seen to be a denial of the divinity of Jesus, simply because of his assertion of the 
soteriological place of Jesus’ humanity.15 I experienced something similar when I 
gave a paper on Colossians 1:15ff in the States last year and a reviewer suggested that 
I was an Arian, because I had highlighted that the Son—as he is represented in that 
text—has a creaturely nature which is essential to his mediatorial role. The divinity of 
Christ has taken on a proportion that wrongly eclipses or distorts the humanity; this is 
a long way from classical two-natures Christology and its assertion, “the unassumed 
is the unhealed.”16 The second example is atonement and this one, I think, cuts both 
ways. The defense of penal substitutionary accounts—which do, I think, find support 
in the New Testament—is typically made in an exclusive way, but so, too, are the 
alternatives. The possibility that we may have something that involves a range of 
complementary but different images of exchange—including blame-taking, but also 
including healing and purification—has been buried in much of the discussion. One 
we recognize the presence of a range of images, which may be overlaid (as they are in 
Isaiah 53), the real question becomes one of proportion. I am an evangelical and want 
to affirm the place of penal elements in the New Testament representation of 
atonement (particularly in 1 Peter) but, honestly, I think it is a relatively small and not 
necessarily central place; moreover, the penal substitutionary idea is itself a particular 
 
15 See, for example, Aubrey Sequiera, “Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in 
the Epistle to the Hebrews (Review),” in Credo 4 (2014). Available online at: 
https://credomag.com/2014/01/atonement-and-the-logic-of-resurrection-in-the-
epistle-to-the-hebrews-review/ 
16 This statement is found in Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistolae 101, but the concept 
that it articulates is found more widely in Patristic theology, with analogues in 
Irenaeus and Athanasius, among others. 
metaphor, deployed to render the significance of what the texts say. At the same time, 
I want to assert that atonement can never be reduced to ritual or cultic issues; these 
need to be balanced by reflection on the place of, e.g., therapeutic or reconciliatory 
language in the New Testament.  
 
Concluding Reflections: Conversation as a Two-Way Activity 
 
These last points take us to the issue with which I want to close this paper. Up to this 
point, I have really been speaking about how biblical scholars overcome their lack of 
facility with theological scholarship, in order to engage in theologically responsible 
interpretation. I want to close by flipping this point and highlighting that theologians 
need to listen to biblical scholars in this conversation, too. Once the considerations 
highlighted up to this point have been acknowledged, biblical scholars who are alert 
to them can deeply enrich the theological task. What can we identify by way of 
articulations between doctrines in the texts of the Bible, and how might this speak to 
the theological formulations? What proportions do the various doctrinal elements 
have in the Bible and how might this control theological formulations? If the Bible is 
indeed the normative text of Christian theology, how does it speak into such issues of 
order, articulation and proportion? How does it disrupt properly a theological task that 
might have drifted too far from it? If we find a range of images for salvation in the 
New Testament, how does this speak to our concept of atonement? How does the 
representation of the church in Paul and in James speak to our ecclesiology? Do these 
call us to jettison ideas because they are entirely at odds with what we find in the 
bible, or do we more modestly consider the proportions to be in tension. To what 
extent can we engage in an analytic theology, when the normative text often works by 
collaging imagery, rather than proposing logics? 
Reaffirming the place of the Bible in these ways can help to expose the extent to 
which modern theology suffers from the same problems as modern biblical studies; 
often dislocated from its moorings, both in scripture and in tradition, it is itself subject 
to the problems of disproportion and disordering. Its own linguistics are not 
adequately attentive to those of the biblical text. Re-attaching the fragments, and 
allowing them to contextualize and inform one another properly, may not immediately 
solve this problem, but it does begin to expose it.  Part of this, of course, may involve 
one particular common area of study that I have said nothing of so far, which is the 
place that historical theology, reception history and the commentary traditions occupy 
in the task of theological interpretation. This, I’m sure, will be dealt with elsewhere in 
the conference, but we can note here that the study of receptions and commentaries 
from the pre-modern period can help to illustrate what the negotiation of the distinct 
tasks of treatise, sermon and commentary looked like for those who were less dis-
integrated than we are. They invite reflection on how they make different moves than 
we might make, both as theologians and biblical scholars, and why this is the case. I 
would suggest that similar insights can also be gleaned from the better examples of 
contemporary preaching, from well-formed pastors who reflect seriously on how the 
Word of God might speak to them and to their congregations today.    
One last point can be made on this representation of the task as a two-way 
conversation. As with all conversations, the productivity depends to no small extent 
on the character and temperament of the participants, and the task is successful only if 
it is attended by critical generosity and humility. Without naming anyone, I think we 
are all aware that there are some scholars who have engaged with each other across 
the disciplinary bounds without real generosity: they are aggressive, defensive, 
dismissive and, frankly, arrogant. They often see their activity as one that makes and 
defends actual theology, in the sense that they really are saying things that are true of 
God, and there is no charity in their engagements with the disciplinary other. Even if 
it should be the case that they are correct in their assertions, their mode of interaction 
is one that commodifies the intellectual good and, indeed, commodifies Scripture. It 
ceases to be the living voice that is—and must always be—the one speaking 
normatively into our conversation. So, I will closec with these words from Luke 
Timothy Johnson and suggest that they speak to both sides of the biblical and 
theological task equally: 
 
We must also let go of any pretense of closing the New Testament within 
some comprehensive, all-purpose, singular reading which reduces its 
complexity to simplicity. Whether we call it New Testament Theology, or 
Narrativity, or Existential Hermeneutics, or something else, we must recognize 
our attempts to reduce multiplicity to unity, to nail down some central, single, 
encompassing meaning in the New Testament that is also and above all 
portable, as attempts precisely at closure. We must recognize our tendency to 
seek a stable package of meaning that we can then apply to other situations or 
fit within out systematic theological constructs, so that, ideally, we need never 
really read the texts again.17 
 
17  Luke Timothy Johnson, Scripture and Discernment: Decision-Making in the 
Church (Nashville: Abingdon, 1983), 55. 
